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To quickly adapt to technological change and developments, and thus remain competitive, firms increasingly 
resort to the use of external technology. This paper investigates whether and to what extent the acquisition of 
external disembodied technology affects the efficiency and productivity in innovation of technology acquiring 
firms. Using the stochastic frontier analysis combined with a difference-in-difference matching approach and 
firm-level panel from the German Innovation Survey for the period 1992–2004, we find that manufacturing 
firms  that  acquire  disembodied  technology  experience  more  growth  in  innovative  productivity  than  non-
acquiring firms do. Thus, this study provides evidence on complementarity between internal and external R&D 
in  innovation  production,  which  is  attributed  by  increasing  returns  to  R&D  scale  and  increasing  technical 
efficiency. Moreover, we find that firm size significantly contributes to innovative efficiency and productivity of 
external technology acquirers. 
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1  Introduction 
The recent rise of external technology acquisition is attributed to the growing complexity, 
speed, and uncertainty of technological developments, combined with greater codification of 
R&D processes that facilitate R&D contracting and segmentation of R&D activities (e.g., 
Grandstrand et al., 1992; Narula, 2001). To create sustainable performance differentials with 
competitors, firms must constantly update their technological capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 
1994). However, in many industries, accelerating own R&D efforts and developing internal 
innovative  capabilities are no  longer  sufficient in light of  the  increasing cost, speed, and 
complexity of technological developments. Because of the high risk due to the low probability 
of innovation success and the length of required time for innovation to provide adequate 
returns, internal developments may be perceived as undesirable by firms (Hitt et al., 1991). 
Thus,  firms  prefer  to  invest  fewer  resources  in  internal  R&D  when  faced  with  resource 
constraints or when there are attractive external sources of innovation. Compared to internal 
R&D, external sourcing allows a firm to obtain knowledge and technology beyond its current 
capability and routines (Mitchell and Singh, 1996). The combination of external technology 
sourcing  and  internal  R&D  can  allow  firms  to  benefit  from  research  complementarities 
through involvement in multiple technological trajectories, research directions that cannot be 
developed simultaneously (at sufficient speed) in-house, and the use of outside skills that can 
exploit in-house research more effectively. 
The present paper examines the impact of external technology  acquisition  on a  firm’s 
innovation performance in transforming innovation resources into commercially successful 
output. We focus on the disembodied technology sourcing such as licensing-in and R&D 
contracting, which are similar in that neither requires a joint research effort. Both technology 
sources can be viewed as two, possibly substitutable, ways of acquiring innovative knowledge 
and entail very little financial risk but grant quick access to necessary technology that is 
beyond in-house capabilities. In contrast to previous studies, the innovation performance of 
firms is determined not only by their resources and innovation inputs, but more importantly 
by their productivity in innovation and the factors that affect this productivity. In particular, 
we separate the effects of technical efficiency, scale efficiency, and technological level in 
attaining innovative productivity. 
With respect to innovative productivity, only a few examples in the literature discussed, 
independent from the issue of technology acquisition, innovative efficiency at the firm level 
by using quantitative approaches. Cosh et  al. (2005) examine the impact of management 3 
 
characteristics and patterns of collaboration on a firm’s innovative efficiency by comparing 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Zhang et 
al. (2003) applied the SFA approach to the R&D efforts of Chinese firms to examine the 
difference in efficiency among various types of ownership. Hashimoto (2008) analyzed R&D 
efficiency change of Japanese pharmaceutical firms using DEA methodology. In addition, 
Korhonen  et  al.  (2001)  and  Cherchye  and  Vanden  (2005)  applied  the  DEA  technique  to 
evaluate the efficiency of university R&D in Finland and the Netherlands, respectively. The 
few  examples,  however,  use  a  two-stage  approach  when  analyzing  the  inefficiency 
determinants
1 and are restricted to estimation of predicted inefficiency. 
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is that, to the best of our 
knowledge,  this  study  is  the  first  attempt  to  empirically  address  the  role  of  external 
technology acquisition in the achievement of innovative efficiency and productivity. More 
precisely, the present study quantifies to what extent technology acquirers are changing their 
innovative efficiency and productivity levels after acquiring external technology. The purpose 
of this study is twofold. First, we intend to measure the relative innovation performance of the 
firms within the German manufacturing sector. A stochastic output distance function is used 
to construct a generalized output Malmquist productivity index (Orea, 2002) for estimating 
the firm’s innovative productivity.  Second, we analyze the impact of external technology 
acquisition on the acquiring firms’ innovative productivity growth. In particular, contribution 
of firm size to the growth of innovative productivity and its components – efficiency change, 
technical change and scale efficiency – following external technology activity is examined. 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of 
external  technology  sourcing  and  innovative  productivity.  Section  3  introduces  empirical 
methodologies  and  specifications  of  the  models  estimated.  The  description  of  data  that 
facilitate our empirical analysis and their descriptive analysis are provided in Section 4, while 
Section 5 presents estimation results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Theoretical Background 
In developing new technological output, “dual sourcing” of R&D is imperative (Mitchell and 
Singh, 1996). Together, internal and external R&D create the absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
                                                              
1 See Section 3.1.2 about drawbacks of this approach. 4 
 
Levinthal,  1990)  that  underlies  current  and  future  technical  output.  Because  external 
technology sourcing contributes to the development of absorptive capacity, it has implications 
for the ability of technological firms to generate and enhance new output. Expanding the 
scope  of  a  firm’s  internal  R&D  may  help  mitigate  the  uncertainties  associated  with  the 
emergence of a new technology. However, it is virtually impossible for a firm, regardless of 
its effort, to keep abreast of all the relevant technological advances solely through internal 
R&D.  When  a  new  technology  emerges,  the  technological  know-how  required  for  its 
commercial application may well fall outside the firm’s current area of expertise and the 
firm’s internal stock of technical knowledge becomes less relevant (Teece, 1988). In this 
situation,  firms  must  look  to  external  technology  sourcing  to  complement  their  in-house 
R&D. Access to technological complementarities is one of the most important reasons for 
firms to acquire technology externally since R&D and innovation projects usually require a 
larger amount and more specific assets than do the firm’s other projects (Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Cassiman  and  Veugelers,  2006).  In  addition  to  acquiring  the  necessary  knowledge  and 
competencies, looking outside the firm for such also reduces the firm’s own innovation costs 
and rectifies internal rigidities through cost sharing as well as through risk sharing. 
The literature providing empirical evidence on the effect of external technology sourcing 
on a firm’s innovation performance is growing recently (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers, 2007; 
Narayanan  and  Bhat,  2009;  Grimpe  and  Kaiser,  2008,  Veugelers  and  Cassiman,  1999; 
Beneito, 2006). It has been argued that in order to absorb externally acquired knowledge, an 
effective ‘absorptive capacity’ to identify and effectively utilize this knowledge is essential 
(e.g.,  Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1989).  In-house  R&D  activities  are  often  required  to  create 
sufficient  absorptive  capacity,  which  suggests  a  complementarity  between  internal  and 
external R&D. Empirically, the effective balance between internal R&D and external sourcing 
and interaction between these two strategies has however remained relatively unexplored.  
Although the existing literature acknowledge that the efficient handling of organization 
costs might prove to be central for innovation success (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2008), they focus 
primarily on the success/failure of technology acquisition based on R&D efforts and R&D 
output. However, if R&D resources are not used effectively, additional investment may be of 
little support in stimulating innovation process. At the same time, if innovation outputs are not 
produced effectively, after a certain point, the R&D inefficiency may hinder the creation of 
innovation  and  eventually  would  lead  to  a  technological  exhaustion.  Since  external 
technology sourcing is aimed at securing access to new technology, which can make cost-
cutting possible or allocate fixed costs over a broader R&D base, investigating efficiency and 5 
 
productivity  in innovation  is important for the effective  allocation of external technology 
resources into internal R&D activities. 
The  literature  discussing  the  effects  of  R&D  investment  on  production  productivity  in 
general  emphasizes  the  role  of  firm  characteristics  such  as  firm  size  and  resource  and 
capability  constraints as  important  determinants  of  production  efficiency  and  productivity 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Marriese and Hall, 1996; Danzon et al., 2003, Berghäll, 
2006).  Findings  from  the  empirical  literature  on  the  relationship  between  firm  size  and 
efficiency are ambiguous, but there is indication that firm size could be a main source of the 
heterogeneity in technical efficiency. On the one hand, it is claimed that large firms could be 
more efficient in production because they use more specialized inputs and better coordinate 
their resources. On the other hand, it is emphasized that small firms could be more efficient 
because they have more flexible, non-hierarchical structures, and usually do not suffer from 
the so-called agency problem. 
Moreover, size may have an indirect effect on productivity through other variables, such as 
resource and capability constraints, as variations in these will lead to different patterns of 
behavior  between  small  and  large  firms  (Geroski,  1998).  From  the  evolutionary  theory 
perspective, innovation is an accumulating learning process, irreversible with regard to the 
technological path (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1990; Pavitt et al., 1987). This implies that the 
level  of  accumulated  resources  and  capabilities  will  significantly  affect  future  innovative 
efficiency. These resources and capabilities vary among firms and are determined by a vast 
and  complex  number  of  both  stimulating  and  restraining  factors  that  appear  to  have  a 
significant impact on the innovative process and thus on the innovative efficiency of firms 
(Freel,  2000;  Vossen,  1998).  According  to  Vossen  (1998),  large  firms’  strengths  are 
predominantly material due to economies of scale and scope, and financial and technological 
resources, whereas small firms’ strengths are mostly behavioral, that is, small firms are more 
dynamic, flexible, efficient, and often have closer proximity to the market. Hence, small firms 
will be more likely to face material resource and capability constraints to innovation than 
larger firms will, while larger firms will be more likely to experience behavioral constraints to 
innovation. 
Scale efficiency is another major source of differences in productivity between small and 
large  firms.  Large  firms  are  often  argued  to  be  more  innovative  as  they  enjoy  greater 
economies of scale and scope than do smaller firms (Cohen and Klepper, 1996) and can 
capture the fruits of their innovation. They also have easier access to finance and greater 
capability to invest in R&D or acquire external innovation (Geroski et al., 2002). However, 6 
 
You  (1995)  suggests  that  efficient  firm  size  is  determined  by  the  interaction  between 
economies  of  scale  stemming  from  increasing  returns  to  production  technology  and 
diseconomies of scale stemming from decreasing returns to organizational technology. Thus, 
although large firms may have technological and learning economies of scale, these may be 
outweighed by organizational diseconomies of scale (Zenger, 1994). Indeed, there are various 
arguments as to the impact firm size has on innovation performance. When R&D expenditure 
is  used  as  a  proxy  for  innovation,  there  is  evidence  that  innovation  increases  more  than 
proportionately with firm size up to a threshold point. This is explained by the size advantages 
of large firms in terms of internal knowledge, financial resources for innovation, sales base, 
and  market  power  (Cohen  and  Klepper,  1996).  When  patents  and  innovation  counts  are 
employed  as  indicators  of  innovative  output,  it  emerges  that  R&D  productivity  tends  to 
decline with firm size, either when measured as patents per R&D (Bound et al., 1984) or 
when measured by innovations per unit of R&D (Acs and Audretsch, 1990, 1991). When 
market structure is taken into account, the large firms’ R&D advantage tends to disappear, 
innovative output (in terms of number of inventions) tends to fall as concentration grows, 
while the returns to R&D inputs decrease with firm size (Acs and Audretsch, 1988), which 
implies  that  industry  specifics are  key  factors  in  innovative  performance.  These  different 
findings suggest that the relationship between firm size and innovation performance depends 
on  the  choice  of  the  performance  indicator  and  the  importance  of  technological  regimes 
prevalent to a particular industry. 
Finally,  technical  change  could  be  an  important  factor  in  explaining  innovative 
productivity dynamics because small and large firms use R&D inputs in different proportions. 
If technical change is neutral, then there will be a parallel shift in the production function. 
That is, all firms face the same rate of technical change. If technical change is biased, then 
firms operating at different scales will benefit from technical change at different rates. Based 
on the above considerations, we argue that firm size and technology regime may induce a 
significant effect on the differentials of firms’ innovative productivity. 
Various external sourcing modes are discussed in the technology management literature. 
The  transaction  cost  perspective  treats  the  external  technology  sourcing  choice  as  an 
organization boundary choice among market, hierarchies, and networks/alliances with the aim 
of  curbing  opportunism  (e.g.,  Hennart,  1991).  According  to  the  resource-based  view,  the 
choice of mode is driven by pursuit of competitive advantages and technological capability 
(e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nagarajan and Mitchell, 1998). Based on a comparison of 
different technology acquisition modes, the literature concludes that the effectiveness of any 7 
 
type of technology sourcing depends on the attributes of the technology being pursued, the 
extent  of  technical  change,  and  uncertainty  in  the  external  environment  (e.g.,  Arora  and 
Gambardella, 1994; Steensma and Corley, 2000). 
In the present paper, we investigate two major subcategories of disembodied technology 
acquisition:  firstly,  new  technology  disembodied  through  a  licensing  agreement  and, 
secondly,  outsourcing  of  technology  development  to  an  R&D  contractor.  According  to 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2007), if a firm decides to acquire technology externally, it will find 
that licensing agreements or R&D contracts are the most flexible modes of external sourcing. 
The main advantage of licensing is the speed with which technologies can be acquired and 
applied to own production. To make licensing efficient, licensees must have the capability to 
screen,  identify,  process,  and  utilize  the  technological  know-how  licensed.  Hoekman  and 
Javorcik  (2006)  and  Lopez  (2008)  argue  that  technology  licensing  generates  productivity 
spillovers  and  increases  productivity  in  upstream  sectors.  On  the  other  side,  Grimpe and 
Kaiser (2008)  find positive  and significant effects  for both internal and contractual R&D 
expenditure on the innovation success measured in innovative product sales. R&D contracts 
help firms to acquire technologies without significant irreversible financial commitment and 
firms can selectively and flexibly acquire technology based on their needs and technological 
configuration.  The  contractor  firm  becomes  a  possibility  to  focus  on  particular  areas  of 
research, which provides substantial cost saving compared to full-fledged in-house research 
facilities. When appropriability is high, firms are willing to sell their technology to other firms 
to  appropriate  the  benefits  from  innovating  (Teece,  1986).  However,  licensing-in  and 
contractual R&D might also lead to a reluctance of firms to rely heavily on external sourcing 
of technological knowledge due to the contractual uncertainty, information asymmetry, and a 
limited transferability of tacit knowledge (Teece, 1988). 
 
 
3  Methodology 
3.1  Measuring Innovative Efficiency and Productivity 
Motivated by the knowledge production function set up in Pakes and Griliches (1984) and 
Griliches (1990), this paper considers R&D activity in manufacturing in the context of an 
innovative sales production function. The R&D production function applied to each firm is 
assumed to be well behaved and to exhibit variable returns to scale. It is presumed that all 8 
 
firms  have  the  same  underlying  aggregate  production  function  in  terms  of  standardized 
quantities of outputs and inputs but that they may operate on a different part of it. 
 
3.1.1  Estimation Approach 
Total factor productivity (TFP) using a productivity index is theoretically defined as the ratio 
of an aggregate output index to an aggregate input index. The most widely used productivity 
index is the Malmquist TFP index presented in Färe et al. (1994). The Malmquist TFP index 
measures the TFP change between two data points by calculating the ratio of two associated 
distance functions. Distance functions are a convenient way of describing a well-behaved 
multi-input  and  multi-output  production  technology  without  the  necessity  of  specifying 
behavioral assumptions such as cost minimization or profit maximization. Let a multi-input 
and multi-output production technology at time t be defined as: 
  { } , :  can produce 
M N
t t t t t S x y x y
+
+ = Îℝ   (1) 
where  ( ) ( ) 1 1 ,...,  and  ,...,
N M
i i iN i i iM x x x y y y + + = Î = Î ℝ ℝ are input and output vectors for the i-th 
firm,  1,..., i I = ,  respectively.  With  a  specific  time  period  t,  the  production  technology  St 
transforms inputs xt into net outputs yt for each time period t =1,..., T. Then, the distance 
function  can  be  defined  by  rescaling  the  length  of  an  input  or  output  vector  with  the 
production frontier as a reference: 
  ( ) ( ) { } , min : , /
O
t t t t t t D x y x y S q q = Î   (2) 
where ( ) ( ) , 1 if and only if  ,
O
t t t t t t D x y x y S £ Î .  Furthermore,  ( ) , 1
O
t t t D x y =   if  and  only  if
( ) , t t x y is located on the outer boundary of the feasible production set, which occurs only if 
production is technically efficient. 
The output-oriented Malmquist TFP index as defined by Färe et al. (1994) measures the 
TFP change between two data points by calculating the ratio of the distances of each data 
point relative to a common technology. One main criticism of the Malmquist TFP index is 
that it is constructed under constant returns to scale assumption. Hence, the Malmquist TFP 
index does not provide an accurate measure of productivity change because it ignores the 
contribution  of  scale  economies.  Orea  (2002)  presents  an  approach  to  decompose  the 
Malmquist TFP index into technical change, technical efficiency change, and scale efficiency 9 
 
change where the contribution of scale economies is taken into account without requiring the 
prior calculation of scale efficiency measures as presented by Balk (2001).
2 
The translog distance function for the case of N inputs (x1, x2,…,xN) and M outputs (y1, 
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Applying Diewert’s (1976) quadratic identity lemma to the translog distance function, Orea 
(2002) derives a generalized output-oriented Malmquist TFP index decomposition where the 
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= ¶ ¶ = ∑  represent the distance elasticity and distance 
elasticity share for the k-th input in period t, respectively. The negative of the sum of the input 














  ∑   (5) 
                                                              
2  Balk  (2001)  uses  a  parametric  technique  to  decompose  the  Malmquist  TFP  index  into  technical  change, 
technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change, and input- or output-mix effect. Although Balks’s approach 
is appealing, it does require the prior calculation of scale efficiency measures in which the scale effects are 
measured using the most productive scale size as a reference. As Orea (2002) points out, the scale efficiency 
measures are not bounded for either globally increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale or for ray-
homogenous technologies. More simply, in the case of a single output, a U-shaped average cost curve is required 
for the most productive scale size to exist. 
3 Including time as a variable in the production frontier allows for the shifts of the frontier over time, which are 
interpreted as technical change. Technical change is neutral if 0,  1,...,
kt k N a = = . 10 
 
The scale term takes a positive value when there are increasing returns to scale, i.e. RTS < 1, 
and input expansion or decreasing returns to scale, i.e. RTS > 1, as well as when there is input 
contraction. 
As a  result, the components  of the productivity index  ln
O
vrs G present changes in output 
technical  efficiency  (EFFCH),  technical  change  (TECHCH),  and  a  scale  term  (SCALE) 
depending on RTS values and on changes in input quantities.
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3.1.2  Model Specification 
In this study, we apply a translog functional form of an output distance function with two 
outputs and three inputs. Note that we employ a two-year time lag between inputs and outputs 
in  the  knowledge  production  function.  Estimating  the  translog  output  distance  function 
presented in equation (3) requires conditions of symmetry and linear homogeneity in outputs. 
Symmetry requires the restrictions ( ) , , ,..., j l j l M b b =  and ( ) , , ,..., kh hk k h N a a = . The linear 
































= ∑  
hold. The homogeneity restrictions can be imposed by estimating a model where the  1 M -
output quantities are normalized by the M-th output quantity.
5 The distance term, D
O, can be 
viewed as the error term as follows: 
  ln
O
it it D v u - = -   (6) 
Then, the estimating form of the output distance function of our model is represented as: 
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where
*
1 1 2 / it it it y y y = ;  1   2 , it it y y , and 2 2 , - - kit hit x x  denote outputs and inputs of the i-th firm at the 
t-th and t-2-th time period, respectively; T is a linear time trend that is used as an index of 
                                                              
4 The term  ln o G
vrs
is viewed as the parametric counterpart of the generalized productivity index introduced by 
Griffel and Lovell (1999) when the distance function is translog. 
5 The symmetry restrictions are imposed in the estimation. 11 
 
technology; POSTit is a post-acquisition binary variable;  fit r  represents dummy variables for 
technology regimes that correspond to each firm in the sample;  it WEST is a region-specific 
dummy variable; vit is the random error, which is assumed to be i.i.d. and follows a  ( )
2 0, v N s
distribution independent of the uit, which is a non-negative random variable associated with 
technical inefficiency. 
According to the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, uit is specified as a function of firm-
specific factors that might influence technical inefficiency. In particular, uit is determined by 
the  truncation  (at  zero)  of  the  ( )
2 , u N m s distribution  where  the  general  form  of  the  firm-
specific mean, it m , is specified as a function of variables explaining technical inefficiency of 
firms. In this study, we specify the model of technical inefficiency as follows: 
  0 1 2 1 2 3 = + + +F +F +F + it it it it it it ACQ T C S X m d d d e   (8) 
where  ACQit  is the acquisition  binary  variable;  T  is  a  time  trend;  Cit  is  a  set  of  dummy 
variables that indicate resource and capability constraints to innovation; Sit is a set of dummy 
variables for firm size categories; Xit is a set of firm-related characteristics; and  it e is statistical 
noise. The unknown parameters of the stochastic frontier translog distance function (7) and 
the  technical  efficiency  model  (8)  are  estimated  simultaneously  using  the  method  of 
maximum  likelihood.  This  approach  avoids  the  inconsistency  problem  of  the  two-stage 
approach used in previous empirical works when analyzing inefficiency determinants.
6 
Battesse and Corra (1977) suggest that the two variance parameters can be replaced by two 
new  parameters
2 2 2 2 2  and  / v u v s s s g s s = + = .  The  g -parameterization  has  advantages  in 
obtaining maximum likelihood estimates because the parameter space for g  can be searched 
for a suitable starting value for the iterative maximization routine. If  g  is close to one, the 
deterministic  frontier  is  the  result  because  all  variation  in  the  error  term  is  attributed  to 
inefficiency. Conversely, if g  is close to zero, there is no inefficiency in the disturbance, so 
the estimated function could be estimated by OLS method, for instance. 
After  simultaneous  estimation  of  the  output  distance  function  (7)  and  the  technical 
efficiency model (8), we can compute the components of the Malmquist TFP change index 
                                                              
6 In a two-stage procedure, firstly, a stochastic frontier production function is estimated and the inefficiency 
scores are obtained under the assumption of independently and identically distributed inefficiency. However, in 
the  second  step,  inefficiency  effects  are  assumed  to  be  a  function  of  some  firm-specific  variables,  which 
contradicts the assumption of identically distributed inefficiency. 12 
 
presented in (4). First, the technical efficiency prediction for the i-th firm in the t-th time 
period can be calculated as follows: 
  ( ) exp  where  . it it it it it it TE E u e e v u =  -  = -     (9) 
Thus, the technical efficiency change of the i-th firm between adjacent years   and  1 t t + yields: 
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The technical change and scale efficiency change can be calculated as follows: 
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3.2  Measuring the Effects of External Technology Acquisition 
In this  section, we  present  the  econometric methodology that we  apply  for analyzing the 
effects of external technology acquisition on the innovative productivity of the acquirer firm. 
On  the  one  hand,  simply  comparing  the  innovative  productivity  before  and  after  the 
acquisition is not satisfactory because such a comparison would be beset with variation in 
outcome that is actually due to change in the market environment over time. On the other 
hand, solely comparing the innovative productivity between acquirer and non-acquirer firms 
in the post-acquisition period could be biased due to permanent differences between these 
groups  of  firms.  To  avoid  these  biases,  we  employ  the  difference-in-difference  method 
(Ashenfelter and Card, 1985) which compares the difference in the outcome before and after 
the  acquisition  for  acquiring  firms  to  the  difference  in  the  outcome  before  and  after  the 
acquisition for a control group, i.e. non-acquiring firms. 
However,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  effects  of  external  technology  acquisition  can  be 
assessed properly if there are considerable differences in outcome between acquiring and non-
acquiring  firms.  As  discussed  in  Section  2,  there  are  different  patterns  of  innovative 
productivity  among  small  and  large  firms,  as  well  as  between  manufacturing  sectors. 13 
 
Moreover,  recent  empirical  evidence  indicates  that  since  acquiring  firms  differ  in  some 
important aspects from other firms in the pre-acquisition period, it is important to take these 
differences  into  account  in  any  performance  study  of  acquisitions  (Bertrand  and  Zitouna, 
2008, Gantumur and Stephan, 2007). Choosing an appropriate control group will account for 
this selection bias. To this end, we integrate a propensity score method (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002) into the difference-in-difference approach, thereby controlling for endogeneity and ex-
ante observable firm characteristics. 
For each firm i  in the sample, let  i ACQ  be an acquisition indicator that equals one when 
the firm acquires technology externally and zero otherwise, 
1
i Y  is the innovative productivity 
of acquiring and 
0
i Y  is the innovative productivity of non-acquiring firms. Then, the effect of 
technology  acquisition  is  defined  by  the  difference  between  the  expected  innovative 
productivities  as ( ) ( )
1 0 1 1 i i i i E Y ACQ E Y ACQ = - = .  Since  we  do  not  have  counterfactual 
evidence  of  what  would  have  happened  if  a  firm  had  not  acquired  external  technology,
( )
0 1 i i E Y ACQ =
 
is unobservable. However, it can be estimated by  ( )
0 0 i i E Y ACQ =
 
and the 
effect can be given by the difference in the average outcome between the acquiring and non-
acquiring firms as ( ) ( )
1 0
i i i i E Y ACQ 1 E Y ACQ 0 = - = . The estimator will be unbiased only 
when the acquiring  and the non-acquiring firms  do not systematically differ in  their firm 
characteristics. Rubin (1997) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that a propensity score 
analysis of observational data can be used to create groups of treated and control units that 
have similar characteristics, whereby comparisons can be made within these matched groups.
7 
The acquisition propensity score is then defined as the conditional probability of acquiring 
external technology given a set of firm’s productivity characteristics  i Y  and other firm-related 
characteristics i X : 
  ( ) ( ) 2 2 Pr 1 , it it it it p ACQ ACQ Y X - - = =   (12) 
Thus,  we  account  for  the  lagged  time  structure  of  the  technology  acquisition  decision 
problem. 
                                                              
7  In  these  groups,  there  are  firms  that  have  been  treated  and  firms  that  have  not  been  treated;  hence,  the 
allocation of the treatment can be considered as random inside the groups of firms. 14 
 
Based on the propensity score matched sample, the effects of acquisition on the acquirer’s 
innovative  productivity  can  be  estimated  using  the  following  difference-in-difference 
estimator: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 0 0
2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 + - + -     = - = - = - =     it it it it it it it it E Y ACQ E Y ACQ E Y ACQ E Y ACQ (12) 
where  2,  2 t t - + denote the pre- and post-acquisition periods, respectively. The two-year time 
window surrounding the acquisition event in t allows us to account for the length of time 
required  between  acquisition  of  the  technology  and  its  adaptation  for  innovative  sales 
production. 
Finally, the above estimator is obtained by performing the following regression: 
  0 1 2 3 it it it it it it it Y ACQ POST ACQ POST X b b b b e = + + + × +F +   (12) 
where ACQit is a dummy variable that captures possible differences in outcome Yit between 
acquiring and non-acquiring groups; POSTit is a dummy variable for the post-acquisition time 
period, which controls for aggregate factors that would cause changes in outcome Yit even in 
the absence of acquisition; the coefficient  3 b  represents the difference-in-difference estimator 
of the effect of acquisition on the group of technology acquiring firms; and the vector Xit 
represents  firm  characteristics.  Thus,  controlling  for  the  differences  in  the  technology 
acquired and non-acquired firms’ innovative productivity prior to acquisition, we estimate the 
firm’s post-acquisition innovative productivity compared to what it would have been in the 
absence of the acquisition. 
 
 
4  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
4.1  Sample Description 
The analysis makes use of data from the German Innovation Survey, which is the German 
contribution to the EU’s Community Innovation Survey (CIS). This innovation survey fully 
complies with the methodological recommendations for CIS surveys and adopts the standard 
CIS questions (see Janz et al., 2001 for a detailed discussion). The survey was conducted by 
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and covers a representative sample of the 
German manufacturing sector (as well as business-related services). It is designed as a panel 15 
 
survey and is conducted at the firm level on a yearly basis. The yearly data are updated with 
biannual  survey  data  that  include  more  comprehensive  and  detailed  information  and 
compensate for panel mortality. Each survey reports information on the innovation activity of 
firms in the previous three-year period. The panel design of the survey offers the possibility of 
analyzing seven waves, covering the periods 1990–1992 (1993), 1992–1994 (1995), 1994–
1996  (1997),  1996–1998  (1999),  1998–2000  (2001),  2000–2002  (2003),  and  2002–2004 
(2005). 
Combining the biannual surveys allows us to construct an unbalanced panel covering the 
period 1992–2004 (with lagged year 1992) in which firms appear in at least three subsequent 
survey waves, i.e. at least three times biannually which yields six years of observation so far. 
We use an unbalanced panel in order to account for developments in innovative efficiency 
and productivity growth caused by sector entrants and by market exits, which would not be 
possible using a balanced panel. In other words, a balanced panel containing only firms that 
were active over the whole observation period could bias our results. Next, we restrict our 
analysis  to  innovative  firms  that  continuously  employed  internal  R&D.
8  Furthermore,  we 
choose firms with positive value on innovation outputs, such as innovative sales with new 
products to the firm and innovative sales with market novelties, and on at least one non-
missing input, such as innovation expenditure, labor in R&D, and material expenditure at the 
end of each period. Our effective initial sample consists of 1,555 observations corresponding 
to 412 firms. 
In  the  MIP  questionnaire,  firms  are  asked  whether  they  engaged  (i)  in  external  R&D 
acquisition, (ii) in the acquisition of external knowledge such as licenses, patents, and non-
patented inventions, and/or (iii) in R&D contracting during a certain year. Identification of 
external technology acquisition is based on whether one of these external sourcing activities 
has  been  undertaken.  During  the  period  1994–2004,  on  average,  27  percent  of  the  firms  
acquired  disembodied  technology  externally.  The  frequency  of  the  firms’  technology 





                                                              
8 Each MIP survey wave contains a question as to whether a firm has engaged in continuous internal R&D for 
the last three years. 16 
 
4.2  Variables of the Analysis 
The description of the variables used in the analysis and their summary statistics are shown in 
Table 1. We use two outputs and three input variables in the production function specified in 
equation (7). In particular, the two output variables are defined as the innovative sales with 
significantly improved products or products new to the firm (YINF) and the innovative sales 
with market novelties (YINM). The outputs have been constructed as shares of total sales and 
they are mutually exclusive variables, depending on whether the product innovation is just 
new to the firm or new to the market. 
The three input variables are innovation expenditure (XINEXP), labor (XLRD), and material 
(XM). Innovation expenditures encompass, in addition to internal and external R&D, other 
costs incurred when innovating, such as training costs, market research, marketing activities, 
the  purchase  of  licenses,  capital  expenditures  for  innovation,  and  design.  We  use  the 
innovation expenditure intensity, which is measured as a share of total sales. Labor is defined 
by the number of R&D employees, and material comprises total material expenditure. The 
latter inputs are measured as shares of total employees and total sales, respectively. 
Furthermore,  in  the  distance  function,  we  include  a  post-acquisition  binary  variable 
(POST) which is equal to one for all years subsequent to external technology sourcing and 
zero otherwise. POST allows shifting for the distance function in the post-acquisition period 
in relation to the pre-acquisition one. 
In  the  inefficiency  model  (8),  various  variables  are  included  to  explain  the  technical 
inefficiency of firms. All surveyed firms were asked about the obstacles to innovation they 
have encountered and about the consequences of those obstacles on their innovation projects. 
Specifically, firms were asked to assess the importance of hampering factors. After rescaling
9 
the values, we obtain a dummy variable that takes value zero, when a hampering factor does 
not constrain the innovation activity of a firm, and value one when a constraint to innovation 
is present. We include the factors that decrease the efficiency of innovative productivity such 
as  high  economic  risk  (RISK),  high  innovation  cost  (COST),  lack  of  information  about 
technologies  (TECH),  organizational  rigidity  (RIG),  lack  of  suitably  qualified  personnel 
(PERS), and lack of market information (MARKET) as resource and capability constraints. 
Moreover, we include in the inefficiency model specific firm-related variables, such as 
capital  intensity  (CAP),  export  intensity  (EXP),  and  market  share  (MS).  The  expectations 
                                                              
9 Different scaling was applied to the answers in different waves of the survey, that is, scaling from unimportant 
to important values is sometimes between 0 and 5, sometimes between 0 and 3, and sometimes between 0 and 1. 
Therefore, we have rescaled the values to obtain a binary variable. 17 
 
regarding the effect of capital intensity on innovative efficiency are ambiguous. On the one 
hand,  if a firm’s production process  is capital intensive, any changes or  additions to  that 
process required by a new product will have a substantial impact. Innovative efficiency could 
deteriorate due to substantial sunk investments made in R&D that cannot be exploited by 
existing production resources. On the other hand, dated fixed assets may often be designed to 
accommodate emerging shifts or variations in raw materials and market preferences. If this is 
the case, increasing capital intensity will enhance innovative efficiency. The market share, 
defined as firm sales over total sector
10 sales, captures the relevance of the firm’s market 
power in its sector. There is mixed evidence implying a positive relationship between a firm’s 
efficiency and its market share and increasing productivity due to the increased competition. 
We  expect  a  positive  relationship  between  export  intensity  of  firms  and  their  innovative 
efficiency. 
An acquisition dummy variable (ACQ) which is equal to one for the technology acquiring 
firms  and  zero  otherwise  is  included  in  the  inefficiency  model  to  assess  the  impact  of 
technology sourcing on inefficiency. A linear time trend (T), which indicates how efficiency 
changes with time, is included in both the distance function and the inefficiency model. 
A comparison of the means between the groups of technology acquiring (ACQ) and non-
acquiring firms (NACQ) in Table 1 shows that there are significant differences not only with 
respect to the firm-related characteristics but also in the innovation-specific variables that 
determine the production distance function. 
 





















YINF  Innovative sales with new products to the firm 







YINM  Innovative sales with market novelties as a 
share in total sales 







XINEXP  Innovation expenditure intensity as a share of 
innovation expenditure in total sales 
  0.0655 
(0.0750) 
  0.0575 
(0.0023) 
  0.0741*** 
(0.0033) 
XLRD  R&D labor intensity measured as a share of 
R&D employees in total employees 
  0.0755 
(0.0503) 
  0.0713 
(0.0022) 
  0.0827*** 
(0.0024) 
XM  Material expenditure intensity measured as a 
share of material expenditure in total sales 
  0.4834 
(0.1899) 
  0.4815 
(0.0067) 
  0.4967* 
(0.0088) 
INNOVATION CONSTRAINTS 
RISK  High economic risk    0.4834 
(0.4927) 
  0.5651 
(0.0176) 
  0.5887 
(0.2210) 
                                                              
10 Sectors are defined according to NACE 2 industry classification. 18 
 
COST  High innovation cost    0.6162 
(0.4864) 
  0.5939 
(0.0175) 
  0.6282 
(0.0217) 
TECH  Lack of information on technologies    0.3745 
(0.4846) 
  0.3397 
(0.0169) 
  0.4314*** 
(0.0224) 
RIG  Organizational rigidity    0.3965 
(0.4890) 
  0.3651 
(0.0172) 
  0.4720*** 
(0.0223) 
PERS  Lack of suitably qualified personnel    0.3672 
(0.4824) 
  0.2984 
(0.0285) 
  0.3813** 
(0.0449) 
MARKET  Lack of market information    0.3884 
(0.4876) 
  0.3470 
(0.0189) 
  0.4245*** 
(0.0240) 
FIRM-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS 
CAP  Capital intensity measured as a share of 
investment expenditure in total sales 
  0.0798 
(0.1393) 
  0.0760 
(0.0047) 
  0.0767 
(0.0053) 
EXP  Export intensity measured as a share of sales 
abroad of total sales 
  0.2701 
(0.2555) 
  0.2215 
(0.0081) 
  0.3575*** 
(0.0117) 
MS  Market share measured as a share of firm’s 
sales of total market sales 
  0.0903 
(0.0870) 
  0.0464 
(0.0036) 
  0.0671*** 
(0.0060) 
SMALL  Dummy variable for firms with 10–49 
employees 
  0.2836 
(0.4508) 
  0.3402 
(0.0156) 
  0.2053*** 
(0.0176) 
MEDIUM  Dummy variable for firms with 50–249 
employees 
  0.3852 
(0.4868) 
  0.4076 
(0.0162) 
  0.3403*** 
(0.0206) 
LARGE  Dummy variable for firms with >250 
employees 
  0.3311 
(0.4707) 
  0.2521 
(0.0143) 
  0.4543*** 
(0.0217) 
SB  Dummy variable for “science-based” 
technological regime 
  0.2360 
(0.4247) 
  0.1815 
(0.0127) 
  0.3250*** 
(0.0204) 
FP  Dummy variable for “fundamental process” 
technological regime 
  0.0848 
(0.2788) 
  0.0891 
(0.0093) 
  0.0836 
(0.0120) 
CS  Dummy variable for “complex (knowledge) 
systems” technological regime 
  0.2372 
(0.4255) 
  0.1967 
(0.0131) 
  0.2984*** 
(0.0199) 
PE  Dummy variable for “production engineering” 
technological regime 
  0.1196 
(0.3246) 
  0.1380 
(0.0113) 
  0.0969*** 
(0.0129) 
CP  Dummy variable for “continuous processes” 
technological regime 
  0.3221 
(0.4674) 
  0.3945 
(0.0161) 
  0.1958*** 
(0.0173) 
WEST  Dummy variable for West region    0.6971 
(0.4996) 
  0.6663 
(0.0155) 
  0.7490*** 
(0.0189) 
Observations (firm-years)       1555       1129       426 
% of total          -        73%        27% 
Notes:
  a Comparison of means for acquiring (ACQ) and non-acquiring firms (NACQ). 
           
  b Standard deviations in parentheses.  
            
c Standard errors of the test on the difference of means are parentheses.  
            ** and *** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, most factors hampering innovation are identified more frequently by acquiring 
firms than by non-acquiring firms. In addition, larger firms are more likely to supplement 
their  internal  R&D  with  externally  acquired  disembodied  technology.  Finally,  external 
technology sourcing is predominant in all technological regimes expect for those involving 
continuous and fundamental processes. 
 
4.3  Accounting for Firm Heterogeneity and Sector Specificity 
In the inefficiency model, we include dummy variables for firm sizes in order to analyze the 
heterogeneity in innovative efficiency and productivity that is potentially induced by different size  of  firms.  Firms  are  classified  as  small  if  they  have  10
medium if they have 50–250 employees (
employees (LARGE). A significant impact of firm sizes on the innovative inefficiency would 
show  whether  any  significant  differences  with  regard  to 
different classes of firm size. 
Moreover, in the distance function, we include dummy variables for technological regimes 
in  order  to  control  for  differences  in  technological  and  market  conditions  between 
manufacturing  sub-sectors.  Empirical  evidence  confirms  that  patterns  of  innovation  are 
technology specific and vary across industries (e.g., Nelso
Hence,  it  is  important  to  account  for  the  technological  regimes 
common among firms belonging to different manufacturing sector,
the differences between industrial sectors without accounting for innovation characteristics. 
To this end, we apply Marsili’s typology of technological regimes
basis of technological opportunity conditions, appropriability conditions, cumulativeness of 
learning, and the nature of the knowledge base (for more detail
 
Figure 1. Distribution of product innovators across technological clusters
 
 
Using Marsili’s typology, we classify the industrial sectors into five technological classes
science  based  (SB),  fundamental  process
production  engineering  (PE),  and  continuous  processes
technological regimes and their application to industry sectors is given in 
Appendix. Figure 1 presents the percentage of innovators 
sample. The different size classes of firms in our sample are distributed quite evenly across 
                                                               
11 The Marsili’s classification has been applied to the Dutch and Norwegian manufacturing sector but 
been applied to the German manufacturing sector (e.g., 
19 
size  of  firms.  Firms  are  classified  as  small  if  they  have  10–49  employees  (
250 employees (MEDIUM), and large if they have more than 250 
). A significant impact of firm sizes on the innovative inefficiency would 
show  whether  any  significant  differences  with  regard  to  innovative  efficiency  exist  for 
Moreover, in the distance function, we include dummy variables for technological regimes 
in  order  to  control  for  differences  in  technological  and  market  conditions  between 
Empirical  evidence  confirms  that  patterns  of  innovation  are 
across industries (e.g., Nelson and Winters, 1982; Dosi, 1988
Hence,  it  is  important  to  account  for  the  technological  regimes  whose  characteristics  are 
among firms belonging to different manufacturing sector, rather than control
the differences between industrial sectors without accounting for innovation characteristics. 
s typology of technological regimes, which sorts regimes on the 
technological opportunity conditions, appropriability conditions, cumulativeness of 
nature of the knowledge base (for more details, see Marsili, 2001).
of product innovators across technological clusters by firm size 
 
we classify the industrial sectors into five technological classes
,  fundamental  processes  (FP),  complex  (knowledge)  systems
and  continuous  processes  (CP).
11  An  overview  of  these 
and their application to industry sectors is given in Table A1 in the 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of innovators across technological regimes in our
sample. The different size classes of firms in our sample are distributed quite evenly across 
s classification has been applied to the Dutch and Norwegian manufacturing sector but 
to the German manufacturing sector (e.g., Marsili and Verspagen, 2002). 
ployees  (SMALL),  as 
), and large if they have more than 250 
). A significant impact of firm sizes on the innovative inefficiency would 
innovative  efficiency  exist  for 
Moreover, in the distance function, we include dummy variables for technological regimes 
in  order  to  control  for  differences  in  technological  and  market  conditions  between 
Empirical  evidence  confirms  that  patterns  of  innovation  are 
n and Winters, 1982; Dosi, 1988). 
whose  characteristics  are 
rather than controlling for 
the differences between industrial sectors without accounting for innovation characteristics. 
ts regimes on the 
technological opportunity conditions, appropriability conditions, cumulativeness of 
li, 2001). 
we classify the industrial sectors into five technological classes: 
,  complex  (knowledge)  systems  (CS), 
overview  of  these 
Table A1 in the 
across technological regimes in our 
sample. The different size classes of firms in our sample are distributed quite evenly across 
s classification has been applied to the Dutch and Norwegian manufacturing sector but has not yet technological regimes; there are slightly more medium
and more large firms in the process engineering regime.
Figure 2 shows that external technology acquisition was most prevalent for the science 
based firms, while the firms with continuous process technology were the least likely to use 
external technology for innovation. On average, 45 percent of total acquisitions were ca
out by large firms, while small and medium
acquisitions, respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of external technology acquisition
 
According to Table 2, small and medium
both innovations new to the firm and new to the market than large firms are. As innovation is 
defined  by  innovative  product  sales,  this  implies  that  the  firms  with  smalle
(expressed  by  the  number  of  employees)  are  not  hindered  by  potential  constraints at  the 
downstream value chain activities 
 
Table 2. Innovative product sales of manufacturing firms by size c
 
   
Observation 
SMALL  441 
MEDIUM  599 
LARGE  515 
Total/Average  1,555 
 
Since the time period of analysis covers the early years of the German Reunification as well, a 
dummy  variable  that  distinguishes  between  the  innovative  productivity  of  East  and  West 
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technological regimes; there are slightly more medium-size firms in the science-
and more large firms in the process engineering regime. 
ws that external technology acquisition was most prevalent for the science 
based firms, while the firms with continuous process technology were the least likely to use 
external technology for innovation. On average, 45 percent of total acquisitions were ca
out by large firms, while small and medium-size firms conducted 19 and 36 percents of the 
xternal technology acquisitions by firm size and by technology regime
 
According to Table 2, small and medium-size firms, on average, are more innovative in 
both innovations new to the firm and new to the market than large firms are. As innovation is 
defined  by  innovative  product  sales,  this  implies  that  the  firms  with  smalle
(expressed  by  the  number  of  employees)  are  not  hindered  by  potential  constraints at  the 
downstream value chain activities to bring an invention to the marketplace. 
sales of manufacturing firms by size categories 
Innovation new to firm  Market novelties
Mean  Std.dev.  Mean 
0.4401  0.2889  0.2889 
0.3779  0.2414  0.2427 
0.3084  0.2248  0.2008 
0.3691  0.2467  0.2392 
Since the time period of analysis covers the early years of the German Reunification as well, a 
dummy  variable  that  distinguishes  between  the  innovative  productivity  of  East and  West 
-based regime 
ws that external technology acquisition was most prevalent for the science 
based firms, while the firms with continuous process technology were the least likely to use 
external technology for innovation. On average, 45 percent of total acquisitions were carried 
size firms conducted 19 and 36 percents of the 
by firm size and by technology regime 
size firms, on average, are more innovative in 
both innovations new to the firm and new to the market than large firms are. As innovation is 
defined  by  innovative  product  sales,  this  implies  that  the  firms  with  smaller  firm  size 







Since the time period of analysis covers the early years of the German Reunification as well, a 
dummy  variable  that  distinguishes  between  the  innovative  productivity  of  East and  West 21 
 
geographic regions is included in the production distance function. About 69 percent of the 
firms in our sample are located in the Western Germany. 
5  Empirical Results 
This section  first reports the results for innovative efficiency based  on stochastic frontier 
analysis. Using the parametric decomposition of a Generalized Malmquist Productivity Index 
as described in Section 3.1, we then present an analysis of the productivity effects regarding 
innovation of external technology acquisitions on efficiency change, technological change, 
and scale efficiency change of German manufacturing firms during the period 1994 through 
2004. 
 
5.1  Innovative Efficiency 
In analyzing innovative efficiency in a year, it would not be appropriate to apply input and 
output data for the same year. Instead, we consider that variations in input do cause observed 
changes in output some years later. In this study, we apply a two-year time lag between input 
expenditure and realization of its outcome, e.g. innovative sales. 
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation for the translog distance function (7) and 




Table 3. Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of inefficiency effects model in stochastic 













RISK  δ1    0.2136    2.4591** 
COST  δ2    0.3628    2.9012** 
TECH  δ3    0.6731    5.1443*** 
RIG  δ4    0.0294    1.0704 
PERS  δ5    0.0092    0.8573 
MARKET  δ6    0.8707    4.0739*** 
SMALL  δ7    0.5892    2.5370** 
LARGE  δ8    0.2626    2.0732** 
ACQ  δ9  -0.4201  -5.3452*** 
CAP  δ10  -0.8828  -4.2643*** 
EXP  δ11  -0.1853  -0.4105 
MS  δ12    0.1127    0.0813 
T  δ13    0.0252    0.0524 
Constant  δ0    1.6532    7.0174*** 
                                                              
12 The model parameters are estimated using the FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). 22 
 
 
Variance parameters of distance function 
SIGMA  2 2
u v s s +     0.6129    5.7830*** 
LAMBDA  / u v s s     2.0468    9.1078*** 
GAMMA  ( )
2 2 2 / u u v s s s +     0.7841    8.0236*** 
Log likelihood   - 1433.412 
Notes: The translog distance function and inefficiency effects model are estimated simultaneously. 
            The estimates for parameters of translog distance function are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
            The group of medium-size firms is the base case used for the firm size comparison. 
            ** and *** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The estimates of  l  and  s  are large and significantly different from zero, indicating a 
good  fit  and  confirms  the  specified  distributional  assumption.  As  l   is  the  ratio  of  the 
variances  u s   and  v s ,  it  becomes  evident  that  the  one-sided  error  term  u  dominates  the 
symmetric  error  v,  so  that  variation  in  innovative  sales  from  production  arises  out  of 
differences in the firms’ R&D performance rather than being due to random variability. The 
estimate of g  suggests that 78 percent of random variation in innovative sales is explained by 
inefficiency. Therefore, the inefficiency effects are substantial in the stochastic frontier model 
analyzed. 
Hypothesis tests regarding the structure of the production technology are conducted using 
likelihood ratio tests. Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis that all the d - parameters and the 
intercept term are zero is rejected at the five percent significance level, confirming that the 
joint effect of these variables on technical inefficiency is statistically significant. Furthermore, 
we analyzed whether the chosen translog specification is appropriate by testing it against the 
simpler  Cobb-Douglas  functional  form.  The  likelihood  ratio  test  strongly  rejects  the 
hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas function fits the data better, so we are confident that the 
translog specification is appropriate. 
 














The inefficiency model is not appropriate 
Ho:  0 1 13 ... 0 g d d d = = = = =   76.04    24.38(15)
c  Reject H0 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
Ho: 11 22 33 12 13 23 11 11 21 31 0 a a a a a a b g g g + + + + + + + + + =   37.98    17.67(10)  Reject H0 
No technical change 
Ho:  1 2 3 1 0 t tt t t t t j j a a a b = = = = = =   48.84  12.59(6)  Reject H0 
Notes: 
 a The test statistics have a χ
2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the   
               parameters involved in the null and the alternative hypothesis.  23 
 
                  b For a 95% significance level. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses. 
            
c As γ takes values between 0 and 1, the statistic is distributed according to a mixed χ
2 whose critical   
               value is obtained from Kodde and Palm (1986). 
 
We further test whether the assumption of technical change is evident; the hypothesis of no 
technical change is rejected at the five percent significance level, so incorporation of a time 
trend  is adequate. Thus, the likelihood ratio tests indicate the presence  of inefficiency  in 
production and  that  the  determinants  of inefficiency  should  be  included  in  the  efficiency 
effects model specification. 
We now turn to the maximum likelihood estimates presented in Table A3 and Table 3. To 
interpret  the  estimated  first-order  parameters  of  the  translog  output  distance  function  as 
elasticities of distance with respect to inputs and outputs evaluated at the sample means, all 
variables are scaled to have unit means. The share of turnover from market novelties is used 
as the normalizing output. All the first-order coefficients are statistically significant at the one 
percent level and they have the expected signs, implying that the output distance function is 
increasing in outputs and decreasing in inputs at the sample mean. Taking into account the 
homogeneity restriction presented in equation (7), the estimated output elasticities for the 
sales shares from market novelties and new products to the firm are found to be 0.385 and 
0.614, respectively. Furthermore, since the sum of the input elasticities provides information 
on  scale  economies,  the  RTS  is  equal  to  0.9496,  indicating  that  the  technology  exhibits 
moderately increasing returns to scale at the sample mean. 
The estimated coefficient of the post-acquisition dummy variable is statistically significant, 
indicating that the distance function is shifting in the post-acquisition period in relation to the 
pre-acquisition period. Furthermore, three of the four estimated coefficients of the dummy 
variables for technology regimes are statistically significant, indicating that the intercept of 
each estimated distance function is shifted by the technology regime factors vis-à-vis the 
intercept of an arbitrary base technology regime, i.e. the continuous processing regime. The 
shifting of the distance function is also apparent between West and East regions. 
The parameter estimates for the inefficiency model suggest a number of factors which may 
explain  technical  inefficiency  of  innovative  output.  The  results  suggest  that  innovation 
constraining factors identified by the firms such as high economic risk, high innovation costs, 
and  lack  of  technological  and  market  information  contribute  significantly  to  R&D 
inefficiency.  For  an  average  firm,  however,  the  inefficiency  is  not  affected  by  internal 
organizational rigidities or the lack of qualified employees. 24 
 
The estimated coefficients on the groups of small and large firms are both positive and 
statistically significant, indicating presence of significant size effect on the firm’s innovative 
efficiency in the sample. This suggests that manufacturing firms of small and large sizes are 
less efficient than their counterparts of medium-size. 
The estimate for the acquisition dummy variable indicates that innovative inefficiency is 
lower  for  an  average  acquirer  of  external  technology  than  those  for  non-acquiring  firms 
during the observed time period. 
In addition, the estimated coefficient of the gross capital intensity has a significant negative 
coefficient,  reflecting  the  fact  that  inefficiency  and  fixed  assets  intensity  are  negatively 
related. Thus, an average firm in the sample invests in rather flexible assets which are able to 
cope with market preferences, thereby increasing efficiency in R&D. The effects of market 
share and export intensity variables are insignificant. The insignificant coefficient for the time 
trend shows that inefficiency does not change over time. 
The  firm’s  technical  efficiency  is  computed  using  the  conditional  expectation  of  the 
equation  (9),  conditioned  on  the  composed  error  ( it it it e v u = - ),  and  calculated  using  the 
estimated parameters presented in Tables A3 and 3. The summary statistics of the estimated 
technical efficiency scores are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics for technical efficiency scores 
 









Mean  0.73  0.80   0.67 
Standard deviation  0.21  0.19   0.21 
Minimum  0.16  0.17  0.16 
Median  0.70  0.78   0.68 
Maximum  0.92  0.92   0.81 
Observations   1,555  426   1,129 
 
In total, the minimum estimated efficiency is 0.16 percent, the maximum is 0.92 percent. The 
mean efficiency value of 0.73 implies that, on average, the same inputs could have produced 
19 percent more of the observed output if the inputs were deployed by firm using the frontier 
production  technology.  For  the  technology  outsourcing  firms,  the  mean  efficiency  is  13 
percent larger than it is for non-acquiring firms. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of firms across the range of technical efficiencies. Note that 
the percentages of firms refer to each corresponding group of firms. Across the entire sample, 
17 percent of the firms have a technical efficiency in the range above 80 percent, whereas the most technically efficient firms are those firms complementing exte
in-house innovation activity. In contrast, 2 percent of the technology acquirers and 13 percent 
of  the  non-acquirers  have  a  mean  technical  efficiency  below  20  percent,  and  thus  are 
considered technically inefficient.
Table 6. Acquiring and non-acquiring firms by technical efficiency 
 
 










In Figure 3, the distribution of 
reveals that medium-size and large firms have the highest technical efficiency; 19 and 23 
percents of the medium-size and large firms have a mean technical efficiency above 60 per
cent, whereas only 12 percent of small firms fall within this range. Small firms are more 
frequently found in the technical efficiency range of 40 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of firm size classes by 
 
 
In sum, larger firms are more likely 
external  technology  acquisitions  present  more  innovative  efficiency.  However,  the 
relationship between firm size and technical efficiency is curvilinear, implying that medium
size firms, on average, are the most efficient. Thus,  smaller firms are,  on average, more 
innovative in terms of innovation output (see Table 2), while medium
technically efficient in innovation production.
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In Figure 3, the distribution of firms of different sizes across technical efficiency ranges 
size and large firms have the highest technical efficiency; 19 and 23 
size and large firms have a mean technical efficiency above 60 per
ly 12 percent of small firms fall within this range. Small firms are more 
frequently found in the technical efficiency range of 40 – 59 percent. 
Distribution of firm size classes by technical efficiency  
 
In sum, larger firms are more likely to acquire technology externally and firms engaging in 
external  technology  acquisitions  present  more  innovative  efficiency.  However,  the 
relationship between firm size and technical efficiency is curvilinear, implying that medium
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technically efficient in innovation production. 
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5.2  Innovative Productivity and Post-Acquisition Changes 
In this section we examine the effect of technology acquisition on productivity growth. Total 
factor productivity growth is computed from the estimated output distance function using 
equation (4). This allows us to disentangle the effects of technical change, technical efficiency 
changes and scale efficiency if inputs expand over time, which are evaluated according to the 
equations  (10),  (11),  and  (12),  respectively.  Table  7  presents  summary  statistics  on  the 
biannual growth of the measures of innovative productivity for technology acquiring and non-
acquiring  firms  separately.  Across  the  entire  time  period,  technical  change  was  strongly 
biased, accelerating from -3.6 percent to 9.2 percent. Thus, manufacturing firms were likely to 
render older technologies obsolete at a faster rate.  
 
Table 7. Summary statistics on growth rates of efficiency change, technical change, scale change, and 
total factor productivity change 
 








  ACQ  NACQ  ACQ  NACQ  ACQ  NACQ  ACQ  NACQ 
Mean   0.0163  0.0181  0.0414  0.0222  0.0203  0.0262  0.0780  0.0665 
Std. Dev.  0.0093  0.0059  0.0382  0.0180  0.0177  0.0086  0.0684  0.0302 
Min  -0.0267  -0.1920  -0.0360  -0.0161  -0.0051  -0.0210  -0.0678  -0.0229 
Median  0.0155  0.0171  0.0451  0.0330  0.0228  0.0240   0.1112  0.0492 
Max  0.0224  0.0291  0.0924  0.0617  0.0470  0.0423  0.1618  0.1331 
Observation  406  928  406  928  406  928  406  928 
Notes: The number of observations is smaller than that in Table 5 due to the inclusion of growth variables. 
 
At the same time, the growth rates in efficiency change and scale efficiency were relatively 
moderate, ranging from -2.6 percent to 2.9 percent and from -0.5 percent to 4.7 percent, 
respectively. As a result, output-based TFP growth varies from -6.7 percent to 16.1 percent 
for technology acquirers, while for non-acquiring firms it ranges from -2.2 percent to 13.3 
percent. The average TFP growth rate was 1.2 percent higher for acquiring firms than for non-
acquiring firms during the sample period. Thereby, the highest growth rate for technology 
acquirers is in technical change, at 4.1 percent on average, whereas the highest growth for 
non-acquiring firms occurs in efficiency change and scale economies, at 1.8 percent and 2.6 
percent, respectively. 
After assessing the aggregate productivity of an average acquiring and non-acquiring firm, 
we now focus our analysis on  the  post-acquisition  changes  in innovative productivity. In 
particular,  we  estimate  the  effects  of  external  technology  acquisitions  on  innovative 
productivity, as described in Section 3.2. 27 
 
First of all, we derive an appropriate counterfactual group for technology acquiring firms 
by  estimating  the  propensity  to  outsource  external  technology  using  a  probit  model.  The 
propensity to acquire is defined by the growth rates in innovative productivity and overall 
performance  of  firms.  More  specifically,  the  firms’  growth  rates  in  efficiency  change, 
technical change, and scale efficiency change, as well as in market share, capital intensity, 
and export intensity, are included as determinants of acquisition probability. Moreover, we 
include factors indicative of resource and capability constraints to innovation. Note that the 
determinants are  lagged  by  two  years  to  avoid  endogeneity  problems  in  the  input-output 
relationship. In addition, we include dummy variables for firm size classes. 
The coefficient estimates of the probit model are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix.
13 
Firms with lower technical efficiency change and scale efficiency have a significantly greater 
propensity to acquire technology externally. Hence, deterioration in innovative efficiency and 
diseconomies  of  R&D  scale  appear  to  be  the  driving  forces  behind  the  acquisition  of 
disembodied technology. At the same time, firms experiencing greater technological change 
are more likely to employ external knowledge for their innovation production. Given the 
productivity  determinants,  we  find  that  the  likelihood  of acquiring  external  knowledge  is 
higher for larger firms. While acquisition of disembodied technology is attracted by the firms 
that  have  a  scarcity  of  technological  information,  the  firms  identifying  the  high  risk  of 
innovation for marketplace and the firms facing problems with qualified personnel do not use 
external  technology  sourcing  as  a  mean  for  overcoming  their  resource  and  capability 
constraints. 
As the next step, we apply nearest-neighbor matching on the predicted propensity scores 
derived  from  the  estimation  described  above.  Thus,  at  each  point  in  time,  a  technology 
acquiring firm is matched with a non-acquiring firm in the same technology cluster and size 
class, thereby reducing the possible bias related to unobservable changes. Table A5 in the 
Appendix  displays  the  balancing  outcome  of  our  matching  procedure. We  include  in  the 
matching only variables on annual (e.g., biannual) changes. There are significant differences 
between the growth variables of acquiring and non-acquiring firms across the whole sample, 
while the differences of the same characteristics for acquiring and the matched control firms 
are insignificant. The matching method therefore provides a valid control group to which we 
compare changes in the productivity growth of technology acquirers. 
                                                              
13 Note, in this study, the primary aim of estimating the probability function is to find an appropriate control 
group of firms rather than to examine the determinants of the decision to pursue external technology acquisition, 
which is a question worthy of a separate investigation. 28 
 
We estimate for each of the outcome variables two model specifications: one analyzing 
overall effects on technology acquiring firms and another one accounting for firm size effects 
of  acquirers.  The  former  analysis  reveals  that  medium-size  and  large  firms  have  greater 
innovative  efficiency  and  that  they  engage  more  in  technology  acquisition  than  do  small 
firms.
14 To study the heterogeneity of the technology acquisition effects for different size 
classes, we consider therefore the effects of technology acquisition by medium-size and large 
firms  in  a  separate  model  by  including  the  acquisition  dummies  for  both  size  categories 
(ACQMEDIUM  and  ACQLARGE).  Furthermore,  the  annual  (e.g.,  biannual)  changes in certain 
firm-related variables, such  as capital intensity (CAPCH),  export  intensity (EXPCH),  and 
market share (MSCH), are included as well. In addition, we account for unobserved constant 
heterogeneity across technological regimes, as well as potential external shocks, by including 
both technology regime and fixed year dummies. In this case, the OLS method with robust 
standard errors fits our estimation model well. Since the panel data sample has a cadence of 
two  years,  it  allows  accounting  for  technology  adaptation  and  integration  time  after 
technology sourcing. 
 
Table 8. Effects of external technology acquisition on efficiency change, technical change and scale 
change 
 
  EFFCH  TECHCH  SCALE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
ACQ   -0.0297** 
 (0.0038) 
    0.0167 
 (0.0289) 
    0.0390*** 
 (0.0031) 
 
ACQMEDIUM      0.0038** 
 (0.0018) 
    0.0344 
 (0.0401) 
    0.0458** 
 (0.0230) 
ACQLARGE      0.0070** 
 (0.0032) 
    0.0449 
 (0.0487) 
    0.0419** 
 (0.0183) 




  0.0586** 
 (0.0231) 






ACQ*POST    0.0071** 
 (0.0032) 
    0.0014* 
 (0.0008) 
    0.0091*** 
 (0.0002) 
 
ACQMEDIUM*POST      0.0086*** 
 (0.0006) 
    0.0021** 
 (0.0010) 
    0.0072** 
 (0.0030) 
ACQLARGE*POST      0.0052** 
 (0.0021) 
    0.0019 
 (0.0021) 
    0.0094** 
 (0.0028) 
CAPCH    0.0100 
 (0.0151) 










EXPCH    0.0764** 
 (0.0214) 






  0.0637*** 
 (0.00471) 
  0.0887*** 
 (0.0036) 
MSCH    0.0551** 
 (0.0201) 










Constant    0.0127*** 
 (0.0006) 
  0.0582*** 
 (0.0008) 
  0.0220** 
 (0.0102) 
  0.0490*** 
 (0.0030) 
  0.0699*** 
 (0.0048) 
  0.0801*** 
 (0.0030) 
Observation       766       642       766       642       766       642 
                                                              
14 In the last estimation sample (Table 8), we have 383 technology acquisitions in total, whereby 16, 40, and 44 
percents of the acquisitions have been carried out by small, medium-size, and large firms, respectively. 29 
 
Adjusted R
2       0.58       0.68       0.62       0.64       0.52       0.62 
Notes: The models (1), (3) and (5) include all firms. The models (2), (4) and (6) include medium-size and large   
             firms only. Technological regime and year fixed effects are included. 
             Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%; and 1%, respectively. 
 
A number of interesting insights emerge from the review of the estimates on the effects of 
technology  acquisition  in  Table  8.  The  significant  positive  increase  in  efficiency  change 
suggests that in the second year following technology acquisition, the efficiency change of the 
acquirers is 0.71 percent higher than that of non-acquiring firms with similar characteristics. 
The increase in the average efficiency change is mostly due to the 0.86 percent increase in 
efficiency  change  experienced  by  the  medium-size  acquirers.  The  medium-size  acquirers 
show a low increase in technical change, while the large acquirers do not differ from their 
large non-acquiring counterparts with regard to growth of technical change. This causes a low 
technical change of 0.1 percent at a 10 percent significance level in the overall sample. Yet, 
the results is not surprising since the acquiring firms and control group have been matched 
within their corresponding technology regimes. 
The positive and significant values in the scale effect regression imply the presence of 
increasing  returns  to scale  and  input expansion  for  technology  acquirers  after  technology 
adaptation  in  their  R&D  production.  Both  medium-size  and  large  acquiring  firms  have 
experienced a significantly positive impact on their R&D scale changes. After acquisition of 
disembodied technology, the medium-size firms have increased their returns to R&D scale by 
0.72 percent, while the large firms had even higher returns to scale of 0.94 percent than large 
firms which rely solely on their internal R&D. 
In Table 9, we summarize the growth rates after two years following external technology 
acquisition. Total productivity growth (TFPCH) is derived as the sum of the three growth 
components, i.e. EFFCH, TECHCH, and SCALE.  
 
Table  9.  Summary  of  post-acquisition  growth  rates  of  efficiency  change,  technical  change,  scale 
change, and total factor productivity change 
 







EFFCH  0.0071  0.0086  0.0052 
TECHCH  0.0014  0.0021  0.0000 
SCALE  0.0091  0.0072  0.0094 
TFPCH  0.0176  0.0179  0.0146 
Observation/Acquisition  383  152  169 
 30 
 
We find that acquisition of disembodied technology increases the innovative productivity 
of  acquiring  firms  by  1.7  percent  compared to  the  outcome that these  firms  would  have 
experienced,  on  average,  if  they  had  not  acquired  external  technology.  The  growth  in 
innovative  productivity  is  mostly  driven  by  R&D  scale  efficiency  change,  whereas  the 
contribution  of  the  increase  in technical  change  is  only  moderate.  At the  same  time,  the 
innovative productivity growth of the medium-size and large firms is higher than that of their 
non-acquiring counterparts; the differences between these two sizes of acquiring firms are 
very slight. The 1.7 percent increase in innovative productivity for the medium-size acquirers 
is  due  to  the  increase  in  efficiency  change,  while  the  increase  in  the  large  acquirers’ 
innovative productivity of 1.4 percent is driven mostly by R&D scale effects. 
To sum up, given the continuous internal R&D, the upgraded exploitation of resources, and 
capabilities of technology acquiring firms by combining internal and external R&D induce a 
significant higher innovative productivity growth attributed by increasing returns of R&D 
scale  and  innovative  efficiency.  Although  no  empirical  evidence  for  this  strong 
complementarity  between  internal  and  external  R&D  in  the  context  of  efficiency  and 
productivity in innovation exists so far, our findings are with line to those of Beneito (2006) 
and  Grimpe  and  Kaiser  (2008).  The  former  study  finds  that  contracted  R&D  improves 
innovative output performance (measured by patent application) only when it is combined 
with internal R&D, and the latter study provides evidence that simultaneous use of contractual 




6  Conclusions 
The growing complexity, speed, and uncertainty of technological development is increasingly 
forcing manufacturing firms to make adequate adaptations to the technological changes and 
quickly  respond  to  the  essential  technological  development  –  often  through  external 
technology  acquisition.  In  contrast  to  previous  studies  that  investigate  the  effects  of 
technology  acquisition  on  innovation  exclusively  in  the  context  of  R&D  success,  in  the 
present  paper  we  investigate  whether  and  to  what  extent  an  acquisition  of  external 
disembodied technology affects the efficiency and productivity in innovation of technology 
acquiring firms. The analysis in this paper, which is conducted at the most disaggregated level 
possible with respect to the interrelationship of innovative productivity, external technology 31 
 
sourcing,  and  firm  size,  finds  that  licensing-in  and  R&D  contracting  matter  innovative 
efficiency and productivity. 
Based  on a  stochastic  frontier  analysis  approach, the empirical  results  reveal an  R&D 
inefficiency of 27 percent, on average, for German manufacturing firms during the period 
from 1994 to 2004. This inefficiency is mostly driven by those firms that rely solely on 
internal  R&D  activity,  while  firms  deploying  external  disembodied  technology  are,  on 
average, 13 percent less inefficient than non-acquiring firms. 
This study provides strong evidence of complementarity between  internal  and external 
R&D in innovation production, manifesting as increasing returns to R&D scale and increasing 
technical  efficiency.  The  manufacturing  firms  that  engaged  in  the  acquisition  of  external 
disembodied  technology  experienced  a  1.76  percent  greater  increase  in  innovative 
productivity than non-acquiring firms. In particular, the contribution of an increase in R&D 
scale efficiency change had considerable effects on the productivity growth increase of the 
technology  acquirers.  Overall,  the  increase  in  innovative  productivity  is  driven  more  by 
medium-size  firms  engaged  in  the  acquisition  of  external  technology,  highlighting  that 
medium-size firms are more capable of adapting and then actually using external knowledge. 
The analysis shows that with regard to firm size, firms are distributed quite evenly across 
different technological regimes, but that the technology regimes themselves show a great deal 
of diversity in their tendency to acquire external technology. The results also suggest that 
there are innovative efficiency differentials between manufacturing firms operating within 
different  technological  regimes.  Although  we  emphasize  the  type  of  technology  used  by 
manufacturing firms by disaggregating the industry classification into technological regimes, 
it would be useful if future work on this topic could be based on a more refined analysis of 
different  technological  regimes,  something  we  were  not  able  to  accomplish  due  to  data 
limitations. Nevertheless, we believe the analysis presented in this paper provides a tractable 
contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  impact  external  technology  acquisition  has  on 
innovative  efficiency  and  productivity,  and  the  results  provide  encouraging  step  towards 
future studies. 32 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Sample size and distribution of external technology acquisitions over years 
  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  Total/ 
Average 
Number of 
observations  109  221  201  272  329  249  174  1,555 
Number of acquiring 
firms  -  43  77  96  123  44  43  426 
Percent of acquiring 
firms  -  19%  38%  35%  37%  18%  25%  27% 
 
 
Table A2. Application of Marsili’s typology (2001) of technological regimes  
Technological Regime 
 
Characteristics  NACE Classification 
Science based  High technological opportunity; high entry 
barriers; high cumulativeness of innovation; 
focus on product innovations. 
 
30, 31, 32, 33 
Fundamental process  Medium technological opportunity; high entry 
barriers, strong persistence on innovation; focus 
on process innovation. 
 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24 
Complex (knowledge) 
system 
Medium to high levels of technological 
opportunity; entry barriers and persistence on 
innovation; high degree of differentiation. 
 
29, 34, 35 
Production engineering  Medium to high levels of technological 
opportunity, low entry barriers to innovation, 
medium persistence on innovation; high 
technological diversity, focus on product 
innovation. 
 
25, 26, 27, 28 
Continuous process  Low levels of technological opportunity, entry 
barriers and innovation persistence; 
heterogeneous technology; differentiated 
knowledge base. 




Table  A3.  Maximum-likelihood  estimates  for  parameters  of  translog  distance  function  with                           
inefficiency effects model 
Variable  Parameter 
 
Estimated value  t-statistic 
 
Stochastic distance function 
Constant  α0    0.4642    6.2170*** 
XINEXP  α1   -0.3384    -3.3881*** 
XLRD  α2   -0.2014   -5.6513*** 
XM  α3   -0.5132   -2.3881** 
YINM/YINF  β1    0.3850    3.3070** 
(XINEXP)
2  α11    0.1632    4.3661*** 
(XLRD)
2  α22    0.1897    6.2009*** 
(XM )
 2  α33    0.1123    8.126*** 
XINEXP XLRD  α12   -0.0126   -4.6280*** 
XEXPIN XM  α13   -0.0423   -0.9702 38 
 
XLRD XM  α23   -0.1230   -0.3751*** 
(YINM/YINF)
2  β11   -0.0304   -5.9727*** 
XINEXP (YINM/YINF)  γ11    0.0704    2.7405*** 
XLRD(YINM/YINF)  γ12   -0.1231   -3.1302*** 
XM(YINM/YINF)  γ13   -0.0063   -1.3280 
T  φt    0.0239    5.3092*** 
T
2  φtt   -0.1763   -0.8921 
XINEXPT  αt1   -0.2326   -4.0726*** 
XLRDT  αt2    0.1945    0.1608 
XMT  αt3    0.2380    4.4122*** 
(YINM/YINF) T  βt1   -0.0247   -0.1963** 
POST  ψ    0.2348    2.4087** 
SB 
1 f     0.4231    3.4521** 
CS 
2 f    -0.3609   -6.7987*** 
PE 
3 f     0.5004    2.3880** 
FP 
4 f   -0.4923   -1.5046 
WEST  η    0.1930    4.1072*** 
Variance parameters of distance function 
SIGMA  2 2
u v s s +     0.6129    5.7830*** 
LAMBDA  / u v s s     2.0468    9.1078*** 
GAMMA  ( )
2 2 2 / u u v s s s +     0.7841    8.0236*** 
Log likelihood   -1433.412 
Note: The translog distance function and inefficiency effects model are estimated simultaneously.  
           The estimation results of the inefficiency effects model are provided in Table 3.  
           All variables are in natural logarithm and are normalized by their sample median.  
           The technology regime of continuous process is the base case used for the comparison among technology    
           regimes. ** and *** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table A4. Propensity of acquiring external technology 
Dependent variable: ACQ 
 
Variable  Estimated value 
EFFCH   -0.7480*** 
 (0.0063) 
TECHCH    0.8560** 
 (0.3216) 
SCALE   -1.0062* 
 (0.5229) 
CAPCH   -0.1323 
 (0.1992) 
EXPCH    0.0924*** 
 (0.0022) 
MSCH    0.1495** 
 (0.0419) 
SMALL   -0.0692* 
 (0.0466) 
LARGE    0.3983** 
 (0.1189) 
RISK   -2.3926*** 
 (0.0613) 
COST    0.3681 
 (0.4051) 
TECH    0.2200*** 
 (0.0042) 
RIG    0.0157 39 
 
 (0.0437) 
PERS   -0.8613** 
 (0.4037) 
MARKET    0.0576 
 (0.0488) 
Constant    0.1041*** 
 (0.0008) 
Observation    1,160 
Log likelihood   -1,029.98 
Prob >  ChiSqd    0.00 
Notes: The number of observations is smaller than in Table 5 due to the lagged structure of the treatment  
             probability decision. The group of medium-size firms is the base case used for the firm size comparison. 
             Standard errors are in parentheses.  
             *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table A5. Balancing effect of the matching approach 
 
                                                        
NACQ 
 
ACQ  CONTROL 
EFFCH  Mean  0.0181    0.0161    0.0172 
  t-statistic      4.2719***   -1.5225 
TECHCH  Mean  0.0222    0.0414    0.0401 
  t-statistic     -3.9781***    0.9632 
SCALE  Mean  0.0262    0.0203    0.0212 
  t-statistic      2.7812**   -1.2043 
CAPCH  Mean  0.0141    0.0211    0.0173 
  t-statistic      6.4539***    0.5742 
EXPCH  Mean  0.0212    0.0309    0.0278 
  t-statistic     -4.4878***    1.7592 
MSCH  Mean  0.0197    0.0250    0.0212 
  t-statistic     -2.5522**    1.1302 
Observation  1160    383    383 
Notes: ** and *** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 